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MEANING OF EXECUTIVE POWER
killed or injured. The Americans suffered no serious casualties.75
The significant point about this episode is that President Jeffer-
son, pursuant to his article II powers and without consulting, much
less obtaining the approval of, Congress, sent American military
forces half way around the world with explicit orders to engage in
hostilities if necessary. Not only did Jefferson take this initiative on
his own authority, he did not even inform Congress of the episode
until six month later.76
This necessarily brief survey establishes several points that I
think are important for determining the original understanding of
presidential power in the foreign affairs field. First, the founding gen-
eration understood executive power as conferring a broad authority
that extended beyond the mere execution of the laws. Second, the
unhappy experience with weak Executives in the states and in the
national government during the Revolution and the Confederation led
the Philadelphia Convention to establish a strong, unitary Executive
under the new Constitution. Finally, the understanding of article II
displayed by Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson indicates
that the conduct of foreign relations is an aspect of the executive
power entrusted to the President, subject only to narrowly defined
exceptions. I submit, therefore, that the way that Presidents have his-
torically handled foreign affairs is in accord with the way that the
framers intended for them to act.
II. MICHAEL TIGAR
A. Introduction
Nearly twenty years ago, I wrote an article entitled Judicial
Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " and Foreign Relations.77 I
wrote in the shadow of significant military activity in Vietnam, and
the incursion into Cambodia. I asked what, if any, role the Constitu-
tion required, or permitted, the federal judiciary to play in finding,
declaring, and enforcing the rules of domestic and international law
75. 1 W. GOLDSMITH, supra note 70, at 376-77. Commodore Dale described the
circumstances in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy written shortly after their occurrence,
and enclosed a copy of the action report of Enterprise's commanding officer, Lieutenant
Andrew Sterrett. See Letter of Commodore Dale to the Secretary of the Navy (Malta Harbor,
August 18, 1801), including Copy of Letter from Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett to Commodore
Richard Dale, dated on board the United States' schooner Enterprise (At Sea, August 6, 1801),
No. 165, ASP, Foreign Relations II, 360, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1801).
76. Jefferson informed Congress of the Dale mission in his First Annual Message to
Congress, December 8, 1801. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 11 (J. Gales ed. 1801), reprinted in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 314 (J. Richardson rev. ed. 1908).
77. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970).
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that limit military action by the executive branch.7" Today we live in
the shadow of other conflicts. Therefore, we must once again measure
the roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in the
areas of foreign and military affairs.
In the years following the publication of my article, Presidents
representing both of our nation's political parties have claimed the
unreviewable power-a power that the Constitution seems to forbid-
to take action, and then have justified that action by invoking a
vaguely defined concern for national security and a theory that the
Court ought to keep its hands off. For example, President Nixon
sought to justify warrantless domestic electronic surveillance.79 Presi-
dent Carter made a more extensive claim in the context of alleged
espionage.80 The Reagan administration has taken the argument sev-
eral steps further, claiming a broad immunity from both congressional
and judicial scrutiny of its actions.8 1
There are three questions that I want to address: First, what role
does the Constitution assign to the judiciary in the conduct of foreign
and military affairs? Second, what are the sources of law that the judi-
ciary might apply in its sphere of competence? Third, what are the
implications of these conclusions in today's international situation?
The basic theme of my 1970 article was that the political question
doctrine is all too often a judicial code word for avoiding a judicial
duty to protect litigants from unlawful exercises of executive power.
82
Unfortunately, all too often that definition holds true today.
78. Id. at 1147-52, 1167-78. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Questions" Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (concluding political question doctrine is "deceptive packaging").
79. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 303, 320-21 (1972) (18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) does not confer power on
President to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance based on national security grounds,
and the Fourth Amendment requires prior judicial approval for Executive to conduct domestic
security surveillance.).
80. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), appeal after
remand, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). The Fourth Circuit
held that the "foreign intelligence" exception to the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless
electronic surveillance so long as (1) the object of the surveillance is a foreign power, its agent,
or collaborators, and (2) the surveillance is primarily for foreign intelligence reasons. When
the investigation becomes criminal, however, a warrant is then required. Id. at 915-16.
81. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Finzer v. Barry,
798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct.
1157 (1987); Von Avlock v. Smith, 720 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983). As to the objections to
Congressional scrutiny, see United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also
Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars"
Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854-77 (1986); Turner, The War Powers
Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful, 17 Loy. L. REv. 683, 711-12
(1984).
82. Tigar, supra note 77, at 1165-67.
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B. The Constitution, Foreign Affairs, and the Judiciary
In Marbury v. Madison,83 Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged
that some executive acts are beyond judicial review. 4 Since that dic-
tum was pronounced, Presidents and judges have tusseled about its
meaning. In United States v. Burr,"5 however, Chief Justice Marshall
made it clear that the President was not immune from the judicial
process.8 6 Marshall's opinion in Burr formed the cornerstone of Dean
Wigmore's treatment of executive privilege,87 and is an implicit term
in arguments about the role of the rule of law in matters of state.
Harry Truman thought that he could seize the steel industry and
run it during the Korean conflict because he was the President, there
was shooting in Asia, and the steel industry was threatened with a
shutdown. 8 The Supreme Court, however, had no trouble spelling
out some truths about constitutional governance. First, Presidents
must obey the law.89 Second, in our society, the laws are not silent,
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
84. Id. at 165-66.
85. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (cited with approval in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
86. Id. at 34.
87. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2369-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1987).
88. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black delineated the President's role in the "law
life" of our Nation with succinctness. He stated:
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself. . . . In the framework of our
Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions
in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor
equivocal about who shall make the laws which the President is to execute....
The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed
in a manner prescribed by the President .... The Constitution does not subject
this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or
control.
Id. at 585-88. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at least on this point, phrased it somewhat more
bluntly:
'The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not
go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress see fit to leave
within his power.' The powers of the President are not as particularized as are
those of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers.
The separation of powers built into our Constitution give essential content to
undefined provisions in the frame of our government.
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926)).
Mr. Justice Clark, in his concurrence, concluded that:
[Where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis
confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis;
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even in times of war.9" Third, the judiciary has the power to declare
the law, regardless of who the parties are, when a real case or contro-
versy requires such a declaration in order to decide who wins and who
loses.91 Recently, a majority of the District of Columbia Circuit, sit-
ting en bane, echoed these principles when an American citizen sued
the Secretary of Defense because the United States Government had
taken over his land in Honduras to help mount covert military opera-
tions in Central America.92
These cases reflect a proper judicial attitude towards executive
claims of unreviewable power to conduct foreign and military policy.
After all, some who opposed the adoption of the Constitution did so
because the executive branch appeared to possess too much unfettered
power. In the Virginia debate, Patrick Henry wondered whether a
lawless President would really obey the Supreme Court, or whether
he would use his power as Commander-in-Chief to defy it.93 Simi-
larly, many people may recall that Abraham Lincoln, as a Congress-
but that in the absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent
power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.
Id. at 662.
Mr. Justice Burton also concurred based upon the President's failure to follow the con-
gressionally prescribed procedures. Id. at 660. Mr. Justice Jackson's three bases of presiden-
tial authority are discussed infra in text accompanying note 193.
90. Mr. Justice Black phrased the second truth as follows:
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.... Even though 'theater of
war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional
system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not
for its military authorities.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
91. Id. at 583-84. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was more explicit on this point:
To deny inquiry into the President's power in a case like this, because of the
damage to the public interest to be feared from upsetting its exercise by him
would in effect always preclude inquiry into challenged power, which presumably
only avowed great public interest brings into action.
Id. at 596.
92. Ramirez de Arrellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd and
remanded, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (The destruction of a United States
citizen's Honduran cattle ranch by construction of United States military base presented
justiciable case, and the act of state doctrine did not bar judicial relief.), vacated and remanded
for reconsideration, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (mem.) (vacated and remanded in light of enactment
of Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1884, 1893-1894, which provided compensation for Americans
in Honduras whose property was taken by United States government action).
93. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 59 (3d ed. 1941) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]
(remarks by Mr. Henry at the Virginia ratification convention, June 5, 1788), quoted in Tigar,
supra note 77, at 1172.
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man from Illinois, inveighed against the idea that the President could
make himself like a king, "involving and improvising" the people in
war.94 Patrick Henry's concern, whether one agrees with it or not,
expresses a contemporaneous understanding that the original purpose
of the judicial branch was to ensure that the laws were faithfully
executed.
Of course, Congress was also empowered to restrain foreign mili-
tary activity through the control of appropriations,95 declaration of
war,96 and grant of letters of marque and reprisal. 97 In addition, the
Senate's power of concurrence in treaties98 gave it a role in shaping
foreign policy, although sadly, some are arguing that the Senate can
consent to a treaty without understanding what the executive branch
thinks the treaty means.99 Although the President may embark upon
a course of foreign policy, or step down the road of foreign military
adventure, however, the judiciary will presumptively have power to
fashion some remedy when that conduct infringes upon a private
right.
The opposition to this view, as expressed by the dissenters in
Arellano, °° is based on both factual and legal solecisms. Arellano did
not involve a presidential decision to respond to a sudden attack, so
the hypotheticals conjured out of such imaginings by the dissenters
exult drama over common sense. The dissenters went on to question
why non-elected judges should be telling an elected President that he
was trampling private rights in his march towards a military objec-
tive. 01 The answer is plain in the Constitution's text, and in the "law
life" of the nation. The text recognizes that war is so calamitous an
event, for both public and private interests, that the President, alone,
is not supposed to propel us into one. Justice Story said as much in
his Commentaries on the Constitution.1 2 Our national experience
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12.
95. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
96. Id.
97. Goldman, The President, the People and the Power to Make War, 21 AMERICAN
HERITAGE, April, 1970, at 28, reprinted in 3 R. FALK, THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (1972).
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
99. For a discussion of this dangerous "constitution busting" tactic, see Glennon,
Interpreting "Interpretation" The President, the Senate, and When Treaty Interpretation
Becomes Treaty Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 913 (1987).
100. 745 F.2d at 1545-74.
101. Id. at 1546-49 (Tamm, J., dissenting); id. at 1561-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1166, 1171, at 95-97 (3d ed.
1858); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-26 (A. Hamilton) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed.
1966); Comment, Congress, the President, and. the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1771 (1968); Comment, The President the Congress, and the Power to Declare
War, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 82 (1967).
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demonstrates that the rush towards improvident armed conflict is
often associated with jingoistic rhetoric, systematic assaults on the
right of dissent, and a public atmosphere of intolerance. 103 Non-
elected judges are supposed to restrain such things in the service of
the countermajoritarian values built into the Constitution by the
framers. 104
C. The Sources of Law
What do I mean by "law" in this context? Article VI of the Con-
stitution makes supreme the "Constitution," "laws" and "treaties" of
the United States..105 I am sorry to have to say something that sounds
tautological, but the point appears to have been lost in recent days:
Military activity in violation of "laws" of the United States is
unlawful.
I am not talking solely about the so-called Boland amendment,"°
but also about the network of laws that limit the use of United States
funds, territory, and personnel to conduct hostile actions against
countries with whom we are at peace. 0 7 Nothing in the text, history,
or authoritative interpretation of the Constitution gives the President
a shred of justification for violating, or purporting to authorize viola-
tion of, such laws. To argue the contrary is to sunder the most basic
understanding upon which the Constitution was ratified: namely,
that the states party to this compact were not installing as head of
state a king by some other name.'08 Certainly, then, these parties did
not intend to create a "king" free to disregard the law. As Lord Coke
explained in Dr. Bonham's Case, '09 the law stands indifferent between
sovereign and citizen and binds them both. 110 Military activity under-
103. See generally 1 T. EMERSON & D. HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 254-338 (2d ed. 1958).
104. For a more extended discussion of this question, and a detailed response to such
authors as Alexander Bickel, who rather derided the idea of a countermajoritarian institution
asserting itself in this way, see Tigar, supra note 77, at 1136.
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
106. The Boland amendment provisions have appeared in various statutes. See, e.g.,
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865
(1982). The Congressional Research Service compiled a legislative history and summary of the
"Boland amendments" through the summer of 1987, and the report was subsequently
published in the Congressional Record. See 133 CONG. REC. H4585-4987 (daily ed. June 15,
1987); see also H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 395-410 (1987)
(Chapter 26 of the Iran-Contra Report, "The Boland Amendments and the NSC Staff").
107. Relevant statutes are legion. Some examples include the Neutrality Act provisions
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 956, 959, 960, and the War Powers Resolution provisions codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548. See J. STORY, supra note 102, §§ 1163-82, at 94-102.
108. See authorities cited supra notes 97 & 102.
109. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
110. Id at 652 ("[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or
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taken without affirmative congressional approval may also be unlaw-
ful, depending on one's interpretation of the Constitution.111 I have
defended the view that all presidential military activity, other than
repelling a sudden attack, requires congressional authorization, at
least if the activity involves what are, under international law, acts of
war.
1 12
Treaties, such as the United Nations Charter, 3 and agreements
on arms limitation,I 4 also define the limits of lawful executive power.
But there is another, long recognized source of "law" in the United
States-namely, customary international law. For example, when the
Spanish-American War broke out, the United States Navy put a
blockade around Cuba. Two Cuban fishing vessels, returning with
their cargoes of fish, were seized by the Navy, claimed as prizes of
war, and taken to Key West, Florida. There, they were forfeited to
the United States by judicial order. In The Paquete Habana,II5 how-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed the seizure order, holding that the
rules of customary international law were part of the "laws"
embraced within the supremacy clause. 1 6 Under customary interna-
tional law, fishing vessels peaceably engaged in their trade were
exempt from seizure as prizes of war. 7 Therefore, the Navy was
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such
Act to be void."); see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30
(1926).
111. The most complete collection of material from the Vietnam War era is the series of
volumes edited by Richard Falk, supra note 97. More recent military incursions have added
urgency to the debate, but not much to the scholarship in the area.
112. See Tigar, supra note 77, at 1170 nn.152-54. See generally authorities cited in R.
FALK, supra note 97.
113. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (entered into
force October 24, 1945).
114. See, e.g., Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-
USSR, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972); Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, February 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (entered into force May 18, 1972); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered
into force March 5, 1970); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, August 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
(entered into force October 10, 1963).
115. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
116. Id. at 700. See Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321 (1985); see also
Agora, May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371
(1987) (comments by Kirgis, D'Amato, Paust); Agora, May the President Violate Customary
International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986) (comments by Charney, Glennon, and
Henkin); Henkin. International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555
(1984).
117. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686.
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ordered to restore the proceeds of sale to the vessel owners, with dam-
ages and costs.118
Since 1900, international law has undergone enormous change.
Its content has grown to embrace new rights of persons, entities, and
nations."l 9 Most courts have agreed that individuals as such are bene-
ficiaries of rights granted by international law, and may enforce such
rights in judicial proceedings. 20 Some judges, such as Judge Bork in
his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,12 1 have
doubted that individuals, who are not subject to obligations under
international law in their individual, as opposed to official, capacities,
may enforce such rights. Such views, however, are inconsistent with a
growing international consensus. 122
118. Id. at 714.
119. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (not yet in force); Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Forms of Crime Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International
Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 (Organization of American
States (OAS) Convention) (entered into force Oct. 20, 1976); American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/l.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr.
1, Jan. 7, 1970 (entered into force June, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948); Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). See also Continuing
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 511, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-155
(prohibiting expenditure of funds to aid any government's effort to "repress the legitimate
rights of the population of such country contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.").
120. See Tigar, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Pursued Refugee: Lessons
from Letelier v. Chile, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 421, 426-27; see also Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15
(M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
The principle that international law may of its own force confer individually enforceable
rights has long been a part of American law. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886) (violation of the rule of specialty under an extradition treaty violates the rights of both
the requesting state and the prisoner).
121. 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
122. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Deliberate torture under color
of official authority violates international norms of human rights behavior so that Alien Tort
Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350) provides jurisdiction over alleged torturer found and served with
process within United States borders, regardless of nationality of parties.); see also
Government of Costa Rica (In the Matter of Vivian Gallerdo et al.), No. G101/81, 2 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. 12 (1982) (Decision of Nov. 13, 1981) (Determination of whether death of
citizen in prison constituted human rights violation was responsibility of Inter-American
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In sum, Presidents and their agents-including military com-
manders and troops-are subject to the commands of customary
international law that limit violations by one nation of another
nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that limit interfer-
ence in another nation's internal affairs. My summary of the sources
of law is quite independent of my earlier discussion of the proper role
of the judiciary. Even if one believes that judges should not interfere
with particular kinds of executive decisions, the rules of law are still
there, and a President's obedience to them is at least a function of the
oath of office.
Let me make no mistake about my meaning. I tremble for my
country when I see the President proclaim that he and his staff are not
bound by congressional restrictions on how appropriated funds are
spent, even though article I of the Constitution clearly gives the Con-
gress the power over the public monies.'23 Similarly, the supremacy
clause makes binding on the United States those treaties to which it is
a party, including those provisions that accord jurisdiction over dis-
putes to international tribunals. The President, as with the spending
of the public monies, cannot choose to ignore or deride these provi-
sions. Everyone who takes the supremacy clause seriously must insist
that the President not be permitted to pick and choose which parts of
the Constitution, laws, and treaties he will obey.
For example, in Nicaragua v. United States,'24 the United States
Commission on Human Rights.); Case of X v. United Kingdom, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1981) (scrutinizing procedures for confinement to mental institutions); Golder Case, 18 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975) (European Convention creates right of access to courts and right to
counsel); Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (Detention without trial under unusual
circumstances did not violate Articles 5 and 6 of European Convention.). But see Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (rejecting
Filartiga, arguing congressional grant of jurisdiction did not create a cause of action, and
concluding treaties do not confer privately enforceable rights unless treaty self-executing).
For a discussion of the issues raised by the erection of an international human
rights standard, see HUMAN RIGHTS, AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
BIBLIOGRAPHY (J. Friedman & M. Sherman eds. 1985); HUMAN RIGHTs IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (T. Meron ed. 1984); E. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1973); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1973); THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (L. Henkin ed. 1981); THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (K. Vasak ed., P. Alston trans. ed. 1982); Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1982); Henkin, International Human Rights as
"Rights," 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 446 (1979); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens Caused by Terrorist Activity, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1976-1977); Schwelb, The
International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clause of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
337 (1972); Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity of Human Rights Norms, 1979 U.
ILL. L.F. 609.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12; art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
124. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
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attempted to revoke its long standing acceptance of jurisdiction by the
International Court of Justice. Laudably, despite the opening pro-
vided by the United States' continued insistence that the International
Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction, the court fulfilled its duty by
accepting the case, investigating the facts, finding the law, and ruling
on the merits. 25 By a lopsided majority, the court proclaimed that
the United States' actions violated settled rules of international law,
regarding the conduct of nations.1 26
The President and his advisers first derided, then ignored, the
Court's decision 127-a defiance that sets them against the supremacy
clause, and weakens an already fragile, though decisively important,
participant in the quest for peace and freedom in the international
community. I would add that in grasping at the prerequisites of the
imperial presidency, the incumbent has sought to curb dissent by
imposing far reaching curbs on free access to governmental informa-
tion, all in the name of national security, and supposedly insulated
from meaningful judicial review.1 28
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on Merits of June 27, 1986), discussed in Highet,
Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987); see also Maier,
Appraisal of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77
(1987) (comments by Briggs, Boyle, Christenson, D'Amato, Falk, Farer, Franck, Glennon,
Gordon, Hargrove, Janis, Kirgis, Moore, Morrison, Reisman, Teson).
125. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 17, 22-26 (Judgment on Merits of June 27, 1986). On
November 26, 1984, the court found that it had jurisdiction and accepted the Nicaraguan
application. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Application of November 26,
1984). In response, the Agent of the United States, on January 18, 1985, informed the court
that the United States would no longer appear. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1985 I.C.J. 3 (Memorial Order of Jan. 22, 1985). Although
expressing its regret, the court did not refuse to further hear the case. The court recalled to the
United States:
Having taken part in the proceedings to argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
the United States thereby acknowledged that the Court had the power to make a
finding on its own jurisdiction to rule upon the merits. In the normal course of
events, for a party to appear before a court entails acceptance of the possibility of
the court's finding against that party. Furthermore the Court is bound to
emphasize that the non-participation of a party in the proceedings at any stage of
the case cannot, in any circumstances, affect the validity of its judgment. Nor
does such validity depend upon the acceptance of that judgment by one party.
The fact that a State purports to "reserve its rights" in respect of a future
decision of the Court, after the Court has determined that it has jurisdiction, is
clearly of no effect on the validity of that decision.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 23-24.
126. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 146-50.
127. See Highet, supra note 124. See also Maier, supra note 124.
128. See, e.g., Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act, 1984: Hearings on
H.R. 4681 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
MEANING OF EXECUTIVE POWER
D. Implications for Today
More years ago than I care to remember, I studied with the
French conservative political theorist Bertrand de Jouvenel. I was
eager to judge political decisions of the past and present as right or
wrong by my perhaps dim, but always unwaering, lights. Professor
de Jouvenel reminded me that the most enduring lesson of great con-
troversies, such as Truman's steel seizure and the commitment of
troops to the Korean conflict, was that in our passion to see a decision
made in a particular way, we too quickly forgot our most cherished
convictions as to who was competent to make that decision.
Now, as then, that is the first lesson. Agreement or disagreement
with the policies of a particular President cannot blind us to the duties
of the legislative and the judicial branches to play their important
parts. It is no answer to say, "The President is elected to make these
decisions." The members of Congress are elected for this purpose as
well. And, as the very structure of the Constitution makes clear, the
non-elected judges are put in place precisely to enforce constitution-
ally based principles of supremacy of law, even when those principles
are rooted in countermajoritarian values.
A corollary principle is that the political question doctrine,
invoked at times by the courts as a barrier to deciding the legality of
foreign and military affairs decisions that touch on private rights, is
unprincipled and illegitimate. I argued this in 1970 and am more
than ever convinced of this fact by the laudatory terms in which the
doctrine is described by its adherents. They like it precisely because
of its "flexibility," although they concede that its "contours are
murky and uncertain."' 2 9 For me, this flexibility and uncertainty
translates in practice into an unfettered judicial discretion to duck the
duties and surrender the powers that article III clearly confers.
The second lesson is this: In the criminal law of Texas, if you
have suffered an indignity or endured a threat, you can go home, stew
about it for a while, return to the scene hours, or days, or weeks later,
blow away your antagonist, and still have a good defense to a murder
charge.' 30 In the 19th-century, it was sort of like that for big powers.
Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 123, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1984) (statement of Michael E. Tigar,
Raybourne Thompson Centennial Prof. of Law, Univ. of Texas, Austin).
129. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
130. While Texas adheres to the requirement that only "the immediate influence of sudden
passion" will reduce a homicide offense from murder to manslaughter, TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 1974), that is not the end of the story. The accused will generally be
entitled to an instruction that he had the right to carry arms "to the scene of the difficulty and
seek an explanation." See Ruiz v. State, 747 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Mathews v.
1988]
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If William Randolph Hearst and Teddy Roosevelt thought we should
go down into some small Latin American or Caribbean country,
avenge some insult, grab some territory, and further our theory of
government, well, that was the way it was. But in today's world, we
are all-to my regret, at times-living a little closer together and the
armament is a little more powerful.1 3 1
In the wake of World War II, the dozens of newly independent
nation-states asserted their rights to develop along their own lines,
perhaps in ways that we have disapproved. They are reshaping not
only domestic politics, but also the landscape of international law.
The principles of international law are coming to dictate what com-
mon sense should have told us: The new age requires more, and not
less, restraint in foreign and military policy. It requires more, and not
less, attention to the principles of domestic and international law,
which the Constitution makes the supreme law of the land. That is
why we must pay renewed attention to the law and its enforcement.
That is why the Reagan administration has failed America.
III. EUGENE V. ROSTOW
Let me start this talk by recalling what I regard as the most
important and most profound sentence John Marshall ever wrote:
"Let us never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.' 1 32
By that I think Marshall meant at least three things. First, the Con-
State, 708 S.W.2d 835, 837-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Banks v. State, 656 S.W.2d 446, 447
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Under the former Texas law, the grade of a homicide offense was
reduced if the victim had insulted the accused's female relative. See Pitts v. State, 29 Tex.
App. 374, 16 S.W. 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891); Norman v. State, 26 Tex. App. 221, 9 S.W. 606
(Tex. Ct. App. 1888); Willis v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 16, 166 S.W. 1172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914);
Thompson v. State, 72 Tex. Crim. 659, 163 S.W. 973 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914); Wright v. State,
36 Tex. Crim. 427, 37 S.W. 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896); Jones v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 492, 26
S.W. 1082 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894). If the insult was not made to the victim's face, but was
reported to the defendant by another person, it would be enough to trigger this provision if the
victim killed the victim when next they met. See Mathews v. State, 708 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Banks v. State, 656
S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Tave v. State, 620 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
131. At the Symposium, where these thoughts were first expressed, Professor Rostow
remarked to me during a break that "You do not understand anything about self-defense." I
have read the recent literature expounding a right of self-defense that includes anticipatory
invasion of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states. Nothing in the
jurisprudence of any international tribunal, and nothing in the history of either the Security
Council or the General Assembly, justifies such views. The only conceivable justification is an
expansive conception of United States' security interests that is at war with the collective
security obligations of the United Nations Charter, and cynical in light of our rejection of ICJ
jurisdiction in Nicaragua v. United States. The United States cannot unilaterally define its
rights by expanding its claims to dominance: A buffalo does not become a giraffe simply by
sticking its neck out.
132. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
